The long-term promise matters, because liabilities such as annuities have to be backed by long-dated fixed-income assets. The more expensive the present value of government paper, the higher the present calculation of the liabilities. So low interest rates have hurt. Meanwhile, politicians have hammered away at lifetime and annual retirement savings allowances before - in 2015 - putting the kibosh on the effective obligation to buy an annuity at retirement.
Low rates have also meant pitiful annuity incomes, which substantiated the call for 'freedom' in the first place. Then pensions minister Steve Webb suggested he was "relaxed" if people blew their retirement savings on a Lamborghini. We have yet to understand the longer-term outcomes from this experiment with the nation's retirement security. Many people were happy that they would not be trapped in an annuity, understandably believing they knew best how to spend their money.
The ponderous nature of the traditional life assurance business allowed for a good sense of companies' embedded value - the present value of future profits plus the assurer's net assets - against which to judge their share price. Those pursuing closed books of business and thus with the highest visibility of future cash flows - Phoenix (PHNX) and Chesnara (CSN) - became reliable dividend-payers.
Standard Life's (SL.) proposed merger with Aberdeen Asset Management (ADN) shows how far its business has evolved - 'asset gatherer' being the common descriptor. Their combination will create a leading active asset manager with £660bn of pro-forma assets.
They will end up owning two-thirds of the combined group, but I'm not exactly sure why Standard Life's shareholders should celebrate a business that has become ever more cyclical, hitching its horse to an emerging markets-biased manager at a time of rising US protectionism and soon-to-be rising interest rates. The winning streak of its asset management arm's multi-asset offering, Global Absolute Return Strategies, provided huge value, but net outflows in 2016 demonstrated how the tide can turn when managers depart.
The bigger challenge is 'passive' investment management. The risk is that more investors will get tired of the latest active management fad - multi-asset strategies promising 'equity-like returns with less volatility' - and realise the only input they can control is cost. Then a merger that reinforces a "longstanding commitment to active management" might not seem so clever.
Not that it is any easier for those sticking at the life assurance party. The transition to bulk annuity business - where assurers take over an employers' defined-benefit pension promises in return for a premium - is lumpy, unpredictable and notoriously opaque on pricing. Prudential (PRU) has decided to give up on both the single and bulk annuity markets, citing higher capital requirements from EU-wide regulatory directive Solvency II. Selling health and protection to a growing middle class in Asia is a better game.
Legal & General (LGEN) is sticking with bulk annuities as a cash generator for its dividend, and using acquisitions to help bulk up. Aviva (AV.), as the biggest composite insurer, and a big player in the growing corporate pensions market, has other cards to play.
This column is, admittedly, about a decade too late. And many have rejoiced that the annuity cartel was smashed. But with time I wonder if we'll look back to life assurers as some do to the building societies. In a rush for assets and fees, encouraged by short-term government policy, something was lost: assurance for customers and investors.
