Lessons from history: Biden takes tough line on China

When Barack Obama became US President in 2009, with Joe Biden as his deputy, the US foreign policy toward China looked very different than it does today. But the dilemma has been brewing for decades: how to work with a powerful, assertive China without compromising or surrendering national interests. 

Obama’s approach, although it became complicated, was to strengthen ties with China as he saw positive US-China relations as vital to the two countries and the world at large. As Obama himself said: “The relationship between the United States and China is the most important bilateral relationship of the 21st century” and he repeatedly said, “the US welcomes the rise of China.” 

At the official level, 2009 to 2017 saw an impressive degree of constructive cooperation for Sino-US relations. From an economic standpoint, post-crisis developments such as China’s massive purchase of US Treasury bonds, the expansion of the US-China ‘Economic and Strategic Dialogue’, and the ongoing negotiation of the Sino-US bilateral investment treaty induced an admirable level of economic integration.

Culturally, people-to-people exchange programs such as the "100,000 strong initiative" turned "1m strong initiative" (which boosted US students learning Mandarin) as well as the countries’ agreement to offer reciprocal 10-year tourist visas, deepened their bond. 

However, of course, tensions were stirring among the two superpowers. According to the Brookings Institute, China’s most significant misunderstanding of Obama’s tenure occurred during his first term, when then secretary of state Hillary Clinton introduced America’s strategic “pivot to Asia”. 

Motivations for an Asia-centred US strategy included booming Asian economies, the increasingly alarming threat of the North Korean nuclear proliferation, and various regional tensions that posed a risk for conflict. However, Beijing strongly opposed the “strategic pivot”, which many Chinese officials considered nothing but a containment policy aimed at China.

China’s reaction made the US more defensive. American interest groups, the US Department of Defense, and the US military subsequently adopted tough stances on cybersecurity, China’s establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, and its land reclamation efforts in the South China Sea.

While Obama’s stance on China hardened towards the end of his term, Donald Trump took more direct action. Soon after his inauguration in January 2017, Trump pulled out of the Trans–Pacific Partnership and then started placing tariffs on Chinese goods to put pressure on Beijing to comply with American demands. 

Over Trump’s presidency, the two countries were embroiled in countless back-and-forth negotiations, a tit-for-tat tariff war and foreign technology restrictions were put in place. The verdict is out on the efficacy of these measures. For example, the US has led a campaign against Huawei, a Chinese technology company it has accused of spying. Only 10 or so countries have banned Huawei products in their mobile networks, out of the 170 countries in which it operates.  

Washington delivered three rounds of tariffs in 2018, and a fourth one in September last year, on Chinese products worth around  $550bn. China, in turn, set tariffs on $185bn-worth of US goods. 

For two years neither Trump nor China’s President, Xi Jinping, showed signs of wanting to back down. But, on 15 January 2020, the two sides signed the Phase One Deal, which officially agreed to the rollback of tariffs, although many elevated US tariffs on Chinese products stayed in place. The Biden administration has not made changes to tariff structures and is said to be examining the Phase One trade deal. 

What next? 

Public attitudes in the US are hardening toward Beijing – in a recent Pew Research Center poll, 67 per cent of Americans said that their attitude toward China is negative, up from 46 per cent three years ago. 

In early March the Biden administration released its “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance”, which sent a clear message: while the administration is staffed by familiar faces from the Obama days, China policy will not revert to what it was a decade ago. The report refers bluntly to a “more assertive and authoritarian China” that is “the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system”.

However, the cost of full disengagement with China – which now makes up 18 per cent of global GDP – would likely be unpalatable. China makes 22 per cent of global manufacturing exports and many industries rely on China's custom, such as semiconductor manufacturers in the US. If the US tries to isolate China, other countries may take China's side. According to the Economist, China is now the largest trading goods partner of 64 countries, against just 38 for the US. 

Tense exchanges at a bitter US-China summit in Alaska revealed the bitter state of relations between the two superpowers. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, opening the talks, read a list of Washington’s issues with China, citing cyber attacks, China’s crackdown on Hong Kong,  Xinjiang and threats against Taiwan, according to the Wall St Journal. These activities, he said, “threaten the rules-based order that maintains global stability”.

Yang Jiechi, China’s top foreign policy official, retorted by lambasting the US in a 16-minute speech that accused it of being an imperial power that was weak on human rights and racism at home. Beyond a fractious introduction, Beijing broadly cast the summit as a chance to dial down bitterness after the Trump administration’s efforts to curtail China’s global influence and portray China’s Communist Party as a threat to the rest of the world. It appears, however, that treating China as a significant threat and rival is now a matter of consensus in the US.